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A new scheme of quantum key distribution (QKD) using frequency and time coding is 
proposed, in which the security is based on the frequency-time uncertainty relation. In this scheme, 
the binary information sequence is encoded randomly on either the central frequency or the time 
delay of the optical pulse at the sender. The central frequency of the single photon pulse is set as 
1ω  for bit “0” and set as 2ω  for bit “1” when frequency coding is selected. While, the single 
photon pulse is not delayed for bit “0” and is delayed in τ  for “1” when time coding is selected. 
At the receiver, either the frequency or the time delay of the pulse is measured randomly, and the 
final key is obtained after basis comparison, data reconciliation and privacy amplification. With 
the proposed method, the effect of the noise in the fiber channel and environment on QKD system 
can be reduced effectively. 
PACS：03.67.Dd, 42.50. Dv 
In 1984, a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol based on Hisenberg uncertainty principle and the 
no-cloning theorem is proposed by Charles H. Bennett and Gilles Brassard[1]. This protocol, known as 
BB84, can really provide unconditional security. Since then, the theory and experiments of QKD have got 
rapid development[2]. Various QKD schemes based on polarization coding[1][3]-[5], phase coding[6]-[10], 
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frequency coding[11]-[13], time coding[14]-[16] and entanglement[2][17][18] were proposed. In these 
schemes, the one based on polarization coding is influenced by polarization mode dispersion and 
polarization dependent loss, and the polarization state should be recovered at the receiver for QKD system 
in optical fiber. In the one based on phase coding the quantum bit error rate (QBER) is related to the 
interference visibility which is influenced by the noise in the fiber and environment, and the methods to 
keep the stability of the interference should be adopted. So, the bidirectional auto-compensation structure[8] 
and differential phase coding schemes[19]-[21]were introduced. The one based on frequency coding needs 
modulator, e.g. phase modulator or acousto-optic modulator, accordingly is limited by the performance of 
these devices. In the one based on time coding the coherence of light pulse needs to be tested in order to 
determine the security of QKD.  
In this letter, a QKD scheme using frequency coding and time coding is proposed in order to reduce 
the influence of the channel noise. A similar QKD method based on the energy-time uncertainty relation is 
also presented[22]. Compared with the scheme in this letter, it is applied to continuous variable system, 
needs single photon detector with time resolution for time measurement, and also needs many detectors 
for frequency measurement. So it is high in cost. 
The principle of the proposed protocol is shown in Fig.1. At the sender (Alice), there are three lasers, 
attenuators(Att), coupler, time delay module (TDM), control and driver module(CDM), and personal 
computer(PC). Laser 1 and laser 2 produce wide pulses (in time domain) with central frequencies 1ω  
and 2ω , respectively. Laser 3 produces narrow pulses (in time domain) with central frequency 3ω . Let the 
frequency spectrum envelope of the lasers 1, 2 and 3 is Gaussian, with the bandwidth as 1ωσ , 2ωσ  and 
3ωσ , respectively. Here, the frequency spectrum of the narrow pulse produced by laser 3 covers the 
frequency spectrum of the pulses produced by laser 1 and laser 2. The wide pulse produced by laser 1 and 
2 covers the time duration of the light pulse produced by laser 3 and the delayed one (with time τ ). So, 
the light pulses in the two coding basis are overlayed in time domain and frequency domain. Of course, 
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the pulse width of the lasers is less than coherence length. The time delay of a pulse is induced by TDM. 
At the receiver (Bob), there are optical switch (OS), circulator(Cir), Fiber Bragg Grating(FBG) filter, 
Single Photon Detecor(SPD), data collection module(DCM), and personal computer(PC). The frequency 
components with central frequency 2ω  and bandwidth 2ωσ  can be reflected by FBG, while other 
frequency components of light pulses can propagate through FBG. We name the proposed protocol as FT 
protocol for short.  
The working process of the FT protocol is as follows: 
(1)Alice generates two random binary bit sequences: information bit sequence { }, 1, 2,3,...na n =  and 
coding bit sequence { }, 1, 2,3,...nb n = . ① If 0nb = , then frequency coding is selected. Laser 1 is fired when 
0na = , the other two lasers are disabled; laser 2 is fired when 1na = , the other two lasers are disabled. The 
mean photon number per light pulse is 0.1 after being attenuated. ②if 1nb = , then time coding is selected. 
Laser 3 is fired, the others are disabled. The delay value is 0 when 0na = ; the delay value is τ  when 
1na = . 
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Fig.1  The principle of QKD based on frequency and time coding 
 (2)The coded light pulse propagates to Bob through optical fiber channel. Bob performs frequency 
or delay measurement randomly by controlling the optical switch, as shown in Fig.1. ①If frequency 
measurement is selected, then the photon with central frequency 2ω  and bandwidth 2ωσ  is reflected 
by FBG and is detected by SPD2 with the help of the circular, and the photon with central frequency 1ω  
is detected by SPD1. If SPD1 clicks, then the received bit 0ng = ; if SPD2 clicks, then the received bit 
1ng = . ②If time measurement is selected, the photon is detected by SPD3. The received bit 0ng =  when 
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delay is 0, the received bit 1ng =  when delay is τ . ③Let 1ng = −  whether all the three detectors don’t  
click or photon count occurs under the two basis at the same time, that is, SPD1 or SPD2 clicks and 
SPD3 also clicks. 
(3) Bob tells Alice the measurement types (frequency or time delay) by public calssical channel. 
(4) Alice tells Bob the measurement types which are consistant with the coding types and keeps the 
element of { }, 1, 2,3,...na n =  with same types as the sifted key sequence { }, 1, 2,3,...ms m = . 
(5)Bob keeps the element of the received sequence { }, 1, 2,3,...ng n =  with the same types of 
measurement and coding as the sifted key { }, 1, 2,3,...mr m = . 
(6)Alice compares part bits of { }, 1, 2,3,...ms m =  and part bits of { }, 1, 2,3,...mr m =  with Bob by 
calssical channel. Then she calcaulate QBER. If thQBER QBER> , then eavesdropper (Eve) exits, QKD 
falses and return to (1). Otherwise, performs (7). 
(7)Alice and Bob obtain the final key after data reconcilliation and privacy amplification by classical 
channel. 
The security of the FT protocol can be analyzed elementarily as follows: (1)since the weak coherent 
light pusles coded in frequency and time delay overlay each other in frequency domain and time domain, 
the states in the two bases are non-orthogonal and can not be discriminated correctly. In fact, Eve can not 
measure the frequency and time delay of the light pulse accurately and simutaneuosly because of 
frequency-time uncertainty relation, 1tωσ σ ≥ , where ωσ  and tσ  is the width of frequency spectrum and 
time[23]. (2) For intercept-resend attack, Eve can obtain the information bit correctly with a probability of 
50% when the measurement type of Eve is different with the coding type, e.g. when Alice performs 
frequency coding, Eve measures the time delay and he can obtain 0 or 1 with the same probability for the 
light pulse with central frequencies 1ω  or 2ω  and time interval covering 0 τ∼ ; when Alice performs 
time coding, Eve measures the frequency and he can obtain correct result with a probability of 50% for the 
light pulse with frequency bandwidth covering 1ω  and 2ω . So, Bob can detect the Eve’s attack easily by 
QBER estimation. (3) Trojan attack can not be implemented for the light pulse of QKD propagates along 
the fiber in one-way.  
The feasibility of the FT protocol is mainly determined by the devices that meet with the parameters 
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requirement of the system. Let the pulse width of the lasers 1, 2 and 3 in time domain is 1tσ , 2tσ  and 3tσ , 
respectively. We set 1ω  and 2ω  as the telecommunication band (1550nm), ( )3 1 2 2ω ω ω= + . The 
parameters have the following relations: 3 1 2ω ω ωσ σ σ≥ + , 1 32t tσ σ≥ , 1 2t tσ σ= , 1 2ω ωσ σ= . The delay τ  
should be 1 3 3t t tσ σ τ σ− ≥ ≥  for correct discrimination of the pulse and the delayed one. In this system, 
τ  should be larger than trigging interval of single photon detector. Recently, single photon detector based 
on superconductor has the trigging frequency over GHz and is low in dark count[24]. The lasers that meet 
with these requirements can be obtained in the market. 
Now, we analyze the quantum bit error rate (QBER) and final key rate of the FT protocol. Let μ  
denote the mean photon number of each weak coherent pulse. The photon number n in each pulse is 
poisson distributed, !
n
n np e
μ μ−= . Let α ( dB Km ) denote the fiber loss, l ( Km ) denote the fiber length. 
Then the transmission rate of the fiber 1010 lft
α−= . If the transmission rate of the quantum channel at the 
receiver is Bt , the efficiency of the detector is Dη , then the whole transmission rate of the system 
f B Dt t t η= . Assume that the transmission of the photons in each pulse is independent. So, the count rate at 
the receiver for the pulse with n photons is ( ), 1 1 nn ndt t= − −  when dark count is not taken into account, and 
the count rate is ( ), ,1n n nd d n ndt t mp t= + −  when dark count is taken into account, where dp  is the dark 
count probability, m  is the number of the detectors in each basis. From the statistical point of view, when 
dark count is not taken into account the mean count rate ndR  of weak coherent pulse at the receiver is 
,
0
1 tnd n n nd
n
R p t e μ
∞ −
=
= = −∑ . When dark count is taken into account the mean count rate R  of weak coherent 
pulse is 
0
1 t tn n d
n
R p t e mp eμ μ
∞ − −
=
= = − +∑ . So, the sifted key rate siftR  can be given as 
( )1 t tsift s d sR R p e mp e pμ μ− −= ⋅ = − +                                                  (1) 
Where, sp  denotes the percent of qubit used to sift key. 
Here, QBER means the error ratio of the information bit which the receiver obtains after basis 
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comparison, denoted as Q . Qubit error comes from two ways, one is the incorrect clicks of the detectors 
because of channel noise, the other is the dark count of detectors. Based on these QBER can be given as 
( )2 1mnd opt nd d s
sift
R p R p p
Q
R
⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦=                                                   (2) 
Where, optp  denotes the probability with which photons arrive at incorrect detectors, 12 is the error 
probability from dark count, 1_ 2s FTp = , 2m = . So the sifted key rate _sift FTR  is 
_ _1 2
t t
sift FT d s FTR e p e p
μ μ− −⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦ . For the FT protocol, let 1tσ ( 2tσ ) be 1 ~ 1.2ns , 3tσ  be 500 ~ 600 ps , 
the associated bandwidth 101 2( ) 1.047 ~ 1.257 10 /rad sω ωσ σ = × ， 103 2.094 ~ 2.513 10 /rad sωσ = × , and the 
detection gate duration be twice of the width of the pulse sent. So, the effect of time spread and frequency 
spread from dispersion on detection results can be omitted, that is 0optp ≈  when the basis is the same, 
QBER FTQ  of the QKD system can be given as 
( )
_
1 nd d s
FT
sift FT
R p p
Q
R
−=                                                            (3) 
For BB84 QKD system, in which polarization coding or phase coding based on M-Z interferometer is 
applied, 1_ 84 2s BBp = . The sifted key rate of BB84 QKD system _ 84 _ 841 2t tsift BB d s BBR e p e pμ μ− −⎡ ⎤= − +⎣ ⎦ , the 
QBER can be given as[13] 
( ) _ 8484
_ 84
1 1
2
s BB
BB nd nd d
sift BB
pVQ R R p
R
−⎡ ⎤= + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦                                        (4) 
In equation (4), V denotes the visibility, 0 1V≤ ≤ . For phase coding, V denotes the visibility of the 
interference meter. For polarization coding, V denotes the degree to which polarization rotation because of 
polarization mode dispersion affects the measurement results.  
In the proposed protocol, the weak coherent light pusles coded in frequency and time delay are in two 
non-orthogonal states, the error and information obtained by Eve is removed after data reconciliation and 
privacy amplification, being the same as the BB84 protocol, and the final secure key rate can be given as[2] 
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( )net sift AB AER R I I= −                                                              (5) 
Where, ABI  denotes the mutual information between Alice and Bob, and ( )21ABI H Q= − . ( )2H Q  
is the binary entropy,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2log 1 log 1H Q Q Q Q Q= − − − − . AEI  denotes the mutual information 
between Alice and Eve. We assume that Eve perform photon number splitting (PNS) attack first and no 
error occurs, that is, the photons are split to Eve with a proportion 1 ft−  and the residual photons are 
transmitted to Bob with a proportion ft through a channel without loss. Hence, the mean photon number of 
the light pulse obtained by Eve is ( )1 ftμ −  and Eve can get the information with the probability 
( )1 ftμ −  from each pulse sent by Alice. Then, Eve performs intercept-resend attack against the pulses in 
which the detectors of Eve don’t click in PNS attack. 
Since the visibility is the ratio of the subtraction of the number of photon count by the incorrect 
detector from the number of photon count by correct detector over the total number of photon count, the 
incurred bit error rate to Bob can be given as 1
2
V−  under the assumption of the photon counting of the 
incorrect detector derives from intercept-resend attack. For BB84 and FT protocol, if the probability with 
which Eve performs intercept-resend attack is IRp , the error rate is 0.25 IRp and the information Eve 
obtains is 0.5 IRp [25], so the information Eve obtains can be given as 1 V− . The mutual information 
between Alice and Eve ( ) ( )_ 1 1AE FT fI t Vμ= − + − , the final key rate can be given as follows 
( )_ _ 2 _1net FT sift FT FT AE FTR R H Q I⎡ ⎤= − −⎣ ⎦                                               (6) 
Accordingly, for BB84 protocol with polarization coding or phase coding, the mutual information 
between Alice and Eve is ( ) ( )_ 84 1 1AE BB fI t Vμ= − + −  [14]. Then the final key rate is 
( )_ 84 _ 84 2 84 _ 841net BB sift BB BB AE BBR R H Q I⎡ ⎤= − −⎣ ⎦                                          (7) 
Let 1Bt = , 0.1Dη = , 0.25α = , 510dp −= , V is 1, 0.9, 0.8 and 0.7 respectively. The relations of the final 
key rates to the distance are shown in Fig.2. As shown in Fig.2, when 0.7V = , the communication distance 
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of FT protocol is increased by 65Km. When 0.8V = , the distance is increased by 12Km. When 0.7V < , 
the scheme with polarization coding and phase coding can not work, while the scheme with the FT protocol 
can work correctly. So the scheme with frequency and time coding can work in worse visibility compared 
with BB84 protocol using polarization coding or phase coding.  
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Fig.2 The relation of final key rate and length of fiber 
In conclusion, based on time-frequency uncertainty principle a new QKD scheme using frequency and 
time coding is proposed. Compared with polarization coding and phase coding, the effect of birefringence 
and interference instability on the performance of QKD system is reduced. The analysis results of final key 
rates show that the FT protocol can work at worse visibility. A rigorous proof of the security of the FT 
protocol remains a work in progress. Furthermore, the theory of decoy states can be applied to increase the 
distance further and overcome the shortcomings by weak coherent pulse [26][27]. 
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